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I. CONCEPTS, MODELS, THEORIES 
1. "Concepts of Law"
To construct "Rechtsbegriffe" (concepts of law) raises 
suspicion in the scientific community of today. When 
legal theorists dealing with the function of law in the 
welfare state present ambitious intellectual constructs, 
such as instrumental versus expressive law (Ziegert, 
1975), autonomous versus responsive law (Nonet/Selznick, 
1978), substantive versus reflexive law (Teubner, 1982), 
purposive versus procedural law (Unger, 1976; 
Wiethoelter, 1982, 1984), they have to face the 
accusations of violating the basic norms of scientific 
discourse. Special zeal in this policing function is 
demonstrated by authentic legal sociologists (e.g. 
Black, 1972; Blankenburg, 1984). In the name of 
science and with the sharpened tools of modern social 
science methodology they charge the construction of 
"Rechtsbegriffe" as being against the letter and spirit 
of the canons of social research methodology.
To begin with minor offences, conceptualizations are too 
vague and operationalizations extremely cloudy. The 
phenomenon in question is not identified properly. Is 
the law itself formal, substantive, reflexive? Or is it 




























































































professors?)? Are we dealing with theories about law, 
general principles behind the law, or with doctrinal 
constructions within the law? Is it law in the books 
which is supposed to unfold an autonomous logic of 
development, or is it law in action (Friedman, 1984)? 
In addition, there is operational negligence: How are 
broad concepts to be translated into precise measurement 
procedures for empirical research? How is one to decide 
whether, at a certain historical time, law was formal, 
or material, or procedural, or reflexive? 
(Rottleuthner, 1983a:15; 1983b).
A more grave offence in the eyes of the science police, 
is that those constructs do not appear to produce 
theories in the sense of a generalized set of 
assumptions from which testable hypotheses could be 
derived. Rather, they represent vague "concepts", 
ideal-typical configurations of legal elements revealing 
some obscure sort of legal rationality. Worse, they are 
too speculative: they seem to be interested in ideas, 
rather than in facts. How far are they concerned about 
a methodologically sound empirical proof of their broad 
generalizations? Worst of all, they are hopelessly 
normative since they not -only analyze a certain 
potential development in law but argue more or less 
openly for a conscious realization of this potential. 
In short, rather than being good theories about law, 




























































































serve the function of "covering the social interests 
behind such rhetoric by some quasi- distanced 
meta-theory". And, if not intentionally, they do this 
at least sub-consciously via a "projection" of normative 
purposes and similar pathologies (Blankenburg, 1984:1, 
16) .
Legal theorists in turn might defend their 
"Rechtsbegriffe" rather defensively. One way is to 
adapt their constructs as far as possible to meet the 
rigid standards of social science methodology. 
Normative elements are either denied or reduced or at 
least neatly detached from the core analytical-empirical 
elements. Outright speculations are transformed into 
more technical hypotheses disciplined by their 
theoretical derivation. And those hypotheses are 
formulated so that they can be tested by elaborate 
empirical methods (see Rottleuthner, 1983a; 1983b). 
Unfortunately, as a result of this tailoring the 
intellectual constructs are cut of much of their 
explanatory and creative power.
Another defensive defence is to play the game of soft 
science as against hard core science. In this one might 
protect "Rechtsbegriffe" by referring to the relative 
weakness of scientific methods in regard to the 
complexity of their object (Hayek, 1972), to a 




























































































1982), to the inherent normative qualities of scientific 
research activities (the German Werturteilsstreit), to 
pragmatism and legal naturalism (Selznick, 1973), or to 
"anything-goes"-pluralism (Feyerabend, 1975).
Unfortunately, in this game of soft science one loses 
many of the insights of modern theory of science.
2. Theory or Strategy?
In contrast to the defensive arguments, I will try a 
more offensive defense of formal, substantive, 
instrumental, expressive, reflexive etc. law. In my 
view, it is a grave error to subsume "Rechtsbegriffe" 
under the specific logic of scientific inquiry since, in 
the strict sense they are not scientific theories but 
are strategic models of law. Strategic models are, at 
the same time, both more and less than scientific 
theories. They incorporate sociological theories of law 
but transform these into legal constructions of social 
reality. In addition they incorporate normative 
evaluations and strategic considerations. My thesis is 
they represent legal "internal models" of law in society 
their main function being to use the self-identity of 
law to produce criteria for its own transformation. In 
this sense, legal theory does not only form part of the 
subject matter of the scientific enquiry it also forms 
part of the legal system and thus orients legal




























































































to be the private vice of legal theorists might turn out 
to be their public virtue: the ability of legal theory 
to produce normative criteria for a conscious 
self-transformation of the law.
For this interpretation of how and why legal theory 
constructs its "Rechtsbegriffe" I rely on the following 
intellectual traditions:
(1) General model theory (Stachowiak, 1965; 1973). 
This theory develops an understanding of scientific 
theories, legal doctrines, political action programs as 
being the internal models of specific social systems and 
explains the differences between them in terms of their 
purpose, function and social context. The crucial point 
is that internal models do not function as passive 
receivers of external information but as active 
designers of the system's environment. More 
particularly, this theory permits the distinction 
between different sub-models within legal models of 
reality and the analysis of the relations between them 
(empirical, prospective, operative sub-models) (Teubnex, 
1979; see below sub 3).
(2) Cybernetic theory of adaptive systems (Buckley, 
1968). This approach identifies "internal models" of 
external reality as being the main adaptive mechanisms 




























































































constraints into the internal organization as structure. 
Thus, the evolution of complex adaptive systems to 
higher levels depends on the successful mapping as a 
selective matching of system and environment.
(3) The concept of self-reflection of a social system 
(Luhmann, 1981a:198; 1981b:419). The main function of 
self-reflection is the use of a system's identity for 
its self-substitution. Especially, to define legal 
theory as the law's reflective theory identifies its 
function for orienting legal transformation.
(4) Theory of self-referential systems (Maturana, 1970; 
1975; Varela, 1979; Zeleny, 1981; Hejl, 1982a; 
1982b). Concepts of self-observation and 
self-consciousness of systems are developed in which 
systems can be seen to represent themselves and to 
interact with those representations. In the case of 
law, this leads to the necessity of a social orientation 
within the law (in the sense of a consensual description 
of experience), in which the social situation of the 
producers of the description is always presupposed. 
Consequently it makes no sense to attempt a critique of 
lawyers' ideologies in the name of science but rather 
one should formulate those constructs in terms of 
competing social models according to the social context 




























































































What is the relation of strategic models to scientific 
theories? As stated above, concepts of formal and 
substantive law are not to be identified as theories. 
However, they are not un-scientific uncontrolled 
ideologies as our science police suspects (Blankenburg, 
1984). Rather, they incorporate sociological theories 
and must be compatible with scientific developments. To 
use a somewhat ironical formulation, they are "more or 
less empirical theories with practical intentions"
(Rottleuthner, 1983b). In particular, if the models 
ascribe certain social functions to law, they have to 
deal with sociological theories about relations of law 
and society. If legal "formality", for example, means 
setting a framework for autonomous economic and social 
action, further if "materiality" means social guidance 
through law and "reflexivity" means a generalized form 
of legal control of social self-regulation (Teubner, 
1982:252), then obviously, sociological theories have 
something to offer.
Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to describe this 
relation as a contrast between lawyers' ideology and 
social reality. There is no direct access to social 
reality, there are only competing system models of 
reality (Stachowiak, 1973:97). Therefore, one has to 
see this as a problematic relation between legal and 
social models of reality; each having its own rightful 




























































































analytical-empirical environment of science, the 
perception of which is due to more or less severe 
restrictions, and the world constructions of legal 
theory which have quite different restrictions.
The same holds true for the dynamics of motives. The 
motives and value premises of legal constructions of 
reality are different from those of scientific 
constructions (e.g. scientific rationality, experience 
orientation, scientific discourse procedures). That 
means we have to accept different "cognitive 
conditionings" (Stachowiak, 1973:97) as premises of 
operational processes in law and in science. In short, 
the differences between scientific theories and 
strategic models refer to the selection of the model 
variables, the procedures of model construction, the 
methods of testing, the criteria of certainty and the 
requirements for success.
This implies complications for the relationship between 
scientific theories about law and strategic models in 
law. Historical accounts of legal developments or 
empirical sociological analyses are not - as some would 
like to see it - intrinsically superior to legal 
conceptualizations of law in society, due to their 
closer access to social reality. A higher degree of 
isomorphy (structural and material approximation of 




























































































superiority of an alternative model.
Particular, science is not in a position to 
authoritatively define models of external reality. 
Science produces only hypothetical models which can be 
tested in their capacity for strategic purposes. 
Science can serve only as stimulation not as 
notification (Habermas, 1976:107). In a precise sense, 
one cannot speak of an incorporation of theories into 
legal models, or of a legal reception of sociology. 
Rather, one has to see them as competing constructions 
of reality which allow for comparison of their relative 
strength.
It is possible to see this relation as a problem of 
power: who has the power to force his construction of 
reality upon others? (Hejl, 1982a:320).I, however, 
would prefer to see it as a problem of compatibility, of 
possibilities of analogization and of mutual learning. 
Legal history and legal sociology produce results which 
may either be rejected by lawyers or which may lead to 
profound changes in legal model construction. At best, 
there is a productive mutual penetration in the sense of 
scientific "subsidies" (Luhmann, 1981a: 134) of grand 
concepts of law in legal theory. In sum, it is the 
precarious double character of legal models influenced 
by internal legal "ideologies of legitimacy" and 




























































































our understanding of specific types of legal 
rationality.
How are these models to be tested? When we label them 
as legal "models" and not as theories, we have their 
action orientation in mind. If their function is to 
produce criteria for the self-transformation of law, 
they go beyond scientific theories which are tested by 
empirical falsification of hypotheses. At the same time 
they are more than just choices of decisions or 
strategies for the law. We are dealing with competing 
intellectual constructs that contain different 
"empirical" assessments of society, as well as their 
"normative" evaluation and subsequent "strategic"
decision. The premises, structures and consequences of 
all those models can be analyzed and discussed. The 
"experimentum crucis" takes place only when they
re-enter social reality. Since there exist no 
scientifically proven laws of socio-legal development it 
is only legal practice which can decide on the success 
of those competing models. The models can be tested if 
they are institutionalized and exposed to the 
competitive markets of scientific discourse, to legal 
doctrinal controversies, to conflicts of social
movements and to institutional decisions. Experience 
can be gained only in the form of social experiments in 




























































































3. Elements of Strategic Models of Law
What determines the selectivity of such strategic 
models? In terms of general model theory (Stachowiak, 
1965, 1973) models are intensionally defined by three 
elements:
1. projective element: Models are always
representatives of originals which, in turn, may be 
models themselves;
2. selective element: models represent in principle
only specific attributes of the original;
3. pragmatic element: models are not defined per se;
they fulfill their representation function a) for 
certain subjects, b) within a given time interval, c) 
restricted to certain intellectual or factual
operations.
The extension of such a concept is extremely wide. By 
varying and re-combining the three elements, however, a 
meaningful model typology can be formed. This typology 
ranges from graphical and technical models, via semantic 
models at different levels, (among which there are even 
poetical and metaphysical models), to scientific models 
(theories in the narrower sense) and planning and 
decision models (Stachowiak, 1973).
Now, it would be too easy to subsume our "grand 




























































































the "socio-normative" model or the "imperative" model 
(Stachowiak, 1973:234). This would not take into 
account that in strategic models qualitatively different 
model operations take place, different in regard to the 
choice of attributes and the method of their symbolic 
manipulation. In other words, we are faced with 
selections in different dimensions which cannot be 
accommodated within one model type. This suggests that 
they may be thought of as complex models composed of 
three sub-models: an empirical, a prospective and an 
operative sub-model. Thus, one gets close to the 
construction of planning models in politics which differ 
from scientific models in the above-named elements, i.e. 
projective, selective and pragmatic element (Stachowiak, 
1973:269). The parallel is obvious. However, it needs 
some re-formulation in order to grasp the specific 
properties of strategic models of law as opposed to 
general planning models.
The empirical sub-model is the model type with the 
largest distance from action orientation. The degree of 
selectivity is rather low, as well as the transformation 
of the original data into other symbolic systems. The 
empirical sub-model concerns the social fields regulated 
by law, i.e. empirical theoretical statements about 
social structures, functions and development tendencies 
in the regulated areas, and interrelations between legal 




























































































defines the dimension of normative evaluation and 
strategic goals. It refers to fundamental principles 
which justify the specific way that legal norms should 
govern human actions. It has to do with statements 
about the purposes of law, means-end-relations, and 
evaluations of legal and social consequences. The 
operative model, finally, is closely oriented to action 
and shows the strongest degree of manipulation of the 
original data. It has to do with the internal 
conceptual and procedural structure of law and the 
systematization of doctrine.
We do not gain an adequate understanding of those 
sub-models if we see their relation simply as additive, 
as a mere cumulation of otherwise independent empirical, 
normative and strategic elements. Rather, we have to 
take into account their mutual interdependence. All 
three sub-models are highly selective and the problem is 
how to define their criteria of selectivity. The thesis 
is: Criteria of selectivity are to be found in a 
circular relation, in the mutual limitation of the three 
sub-models. If we want to understand why certain 
assumptions about the social world within these models 
differ from scientific theories in terms of testing 
procedure and criteria of certainty we have to see that 
they are determined by the normative and strategic 
context of the prospective and operative sub-models.




























































































between a "concept" of, for example, formal law and a 
mere technical recommendation of normative generality 
and conceptual precision, then we have to realize that 
such a "concept" is informed by underlying theoretical 
assumptions and normative evaluations which are 
formulated in the empirical and prospective sub-model.
To sum up, when in legal theory "grand concepts" are 
produced such as formal, substantive, reflexive law, 
they do not represent external scientific theories but 
internal strategic models of law. Strategic models are 
highly selective legal constructions of social reality. 
Their selectivity is defined by the social context and 
the criteria of selectivity result from the mutual 
limitation of their empirical, prospective and operative 
sub-models. Their ultimate test is re-entry in social 
reality. Their social function is the 
self-identification of the legal system as a criterion 
for its own transformation.
II. COMPETING STRATEGIC MODELS IN THE REGULATORY CRISIS
All these elements of our definition can be identified 
if one looks at emerging concepts in the current 
socio-legal discussion of the regulatory crisis in the 




























































































Reich, 1984). Regulatory law - the most ambitious, 
modern, goal-oriented, sociologically informed type of 
law representing a political mechanism of social 
guidance - is said to be in a deep crisis, or at least 
in a state of institutional failure. Out of this 
diagnosis emerge three concepts of law which deserve the 
name of strategic models. They all use the identity of 
law as a criterion for its post-instrumental 
transformation. But they differ widely in regard to 
their empirical, prospective and operative sub-models 
and their interaction with each other. Depending on 
what problems of regulatory law in relation to regulated 
fields are perceived as relevant and how positively or 
negatively the instrumentalization of law through the 
political system is evaluated, very different types of 
solutions are arrived at.
1. Implementation
The implementation approach represents a strategic model 
in the empirical dimension of which the crisis of 
regulatory law is identified as a problem of 
effectivenes (e.g. Mayntz, 1980). The starting point 
is the guidance intention of the political system and 
law is analyzed as ineffective insofar as it turns out 
to be an unsuitable instrument to fulfill those 
intentions in social reality. Background theories are 




























































































processes (e.g. Etzioni, 1968). These are closely 
related to the prospective dimension. A society is 
envisaged in which the political system takes over the 
responsibility of unresolved social problems of society. 
Compensatory state intervention is supposed to react 
against the undesirable side-effects of the 
modernization processes. The normative goal is an 
increase in social welfare through democratic processes 
and political decisions. Law is politicized in the 
sense that it serves as one of the main mechanisms 
towards the realization of the welfare state. It 
belongs to the inherent logic of this model that, in its 
operative dimension, the crisis of regulatory law is to 
be cured by increasing its instrumental effectiveness 
(Clune, 1983). If the problem of regulatory law is its 
implementation, then effective implementation mechanisms 
have to be designed. The point will then be to 
strengthen the cognitive, organizational and power based 
resources in such a way that the law can cope in 
practice with its control function. In this sense, 
legal doctrine will have to shift from being primarily 
concerned with juridical conflict resolution to more of 
a legal policy orientation (Nonet/Selznick, 1978). 
Legal science will see itself as part of the social 
sciences, which produce control-knowledge (Ziegert, 
1975). Law would then primarily be social technology 
(Podgorecki, 1974). Economic and sociological analyses 




























































































means, at the same time, that the law must take into 
account its own implementation in social reality and the 
social consequences (implementation research and 
consequence control, e.g. Waelde, 1979, Mayntz, 1980).
2. Re-formalization
In the diagnosis of the regulatory crisis, the selection 
of attributes for the empirical sub-model is quite 
different. The crisis is mainly identified with the 
economic and social costs which regulation creates. 
State interventionist law is supposed in be one of the 
main obstacles to reaching the goal of allocative 
efficiency. Background theories are various liberal and 
neo-liberal theories, the concept of "interventionist 
constructivism" being a prominent and ambitious example 
(Hayek, 1972). In the prospective dimension the 
maximation of freedom is the main normative goal. The 
function of law is to define a general framework for 
social freedom insofar as it establishes a sphere for 
autonomous activity and fixed boundaries for the 
property rights of private actors.
In the operative dimension, strategies aim at a certain 
de-legalization, an ordered retreat of the law from the 
"occupied" areas of social life, either by a complete 




























































































in the strict sense), or by concentrating its forces on 
the secure bastions of formal rationality 
("re-formalization", Grimm, 1980). In this connection, 
particular interest attaches to the re-privatization of 
state tasks and also to the abandonment of 
interventionist constructivism in favour of general law, 
in a conception of law as a set of rules of the game 
(Hayek, 1973; Hoppmann, 1972; Mestmaecker, 1978).
3. Control of Self-Regulation
As alternative solutions transcending the distinction 
between formal and substantive law, strategies are 
discussed that amount to a more abstract, more indirect 
control through the law. The law is relieved of the 
burden of direct regulation of social areas, and instead 
given the task of the active control of self-regulatory 
processes (e.g. Bohnert and Klitzsch, 1980). 
Empirically, the crisis of regulatory law is identified 
as an incompatibility of the internal logics of 
different social systems. It has been demonstrated that 
regulatory law programs obey a functional logic and 
follow criteria of rationality and patterns of 
organization which are poorly suited to the internal 
social structure of the regulated spheres of life 
(Pitschas, 1980:150). In consequence, law as medium of 
the welfare state either turns out to be ineffective or 




























































































traditional patterns of social life (Habermas, 1981 
11:531).
Scientific background theories are as a rule current 
macro-social theories; either the theory of functional 
differentiation or variants of critical theory or 
diverse attempts of a selective accommodation between 
them. Prospective orientations of those concepts are 
highly diverse according to the range of macro-theories 
to which they are connected. However, they have in 
common the normative problem of how to achieve social 
integration; how to define the identity of society, 
given the ubiquitousness of disruptive conflicts between 
the different rationalities of highly specialized social 
subsystems (Habermas, 1975; Luhmann, 1982). Clearly, 
this social integration cannot be achieved by the state 
imposing unified norms on society. Nonetheless, social 
integration is still seen as a political problem in 
which the legal-political-system - however indirectly 
-- plays a critical role.
In the operative dimension, "proceduralization" is 
offered as a formula for the role of the law in 
promoting and controlling the setting up of "social 
systems with a learning capacity" (Wiethoelter, 1982; 
1984; cf. as well Brueggemeier, 1982:60). The 
empirical basis is in a whole variety of new forms of 




























































































This approach emphasizes the design of self-regulation 
mechanisms, combining competition, bargaining, 
organization and countervailing power (Hart, 1983:22).
There are essentially three issues at stake: (a) the 
guarantee of life-world autonomy by an "external 
constitution" (Habermas, 1981 11:544); (b) structural 
preconditions of effective self-regulation, for 
instance, by way of "external decentralization" of 
public tasks (Lehner, 1979, 178 ff.; Gotthold, 1983) or 
in the sense of internal reflection of social effects 
(Teubner, 1982; Hart, 1983); (c) canalization of 
inter-system-conflicts through "relational programs" or 
neo-corporatist mediation processes (Willke, 1983:62), 
or by semi-formal procedures of "practice as a discovery 
method" (Joerges, 1981, 1983), or by an 
institutionalized co-ordination of different system 
rationalities (Scharpf, 1979; Assmann, 1980; Ladeur, 
1982, 1984).
III. SELF-REFERENTIALITY AS THE CRITERION?
Is there a reasonable way to choose between those 
competing strategic models? As we said earlier, the 
ultimate test for success is their re-entry into social 
reality. But this does not exclude evaluating them in 




























































































plausible choice can be made: that of concentrating 
intellectual attention and institutional energy on the 
third strategy, the legal control of social 
self-regulation. I find criteria of plausibility in the 
theory of self-referential systems.
Why make use of the theory of self-referential systems? 
This newly developed theory has been formulated by 
biologists (Maturana, 1970; 1975; Maturana, Varela and 
Uribe, 1974; Varela, 1979; Zeleny, 1981) and 
transferred to the social sciences (Hejl, 1982a; 1982b; 
Luhmann, 1981a, 1984; Teubner and Willke, 1984). There 
is not as yet general agreement that it is a fruitful 
paradigm. Thus, we shall use it in a more experimental 
manner as a strictly heuristic device. What follows for 
our problematic law and society relation if we 
reformulate them in terms of self-referentiality? What 
hypotheses, what recommendations for political-legal 
action are implied?
The message of self-reference can be clearly 
distinguished from older versions of systems theory. 
While classical notions of system concentrated on the 
internal relations of the elements, searching for 
emerging properties of the system ("the whole is more 
than the parts"), modern theories of "open systems" 
reject the "closed system approach" and stress the 




























































































Leitmotiv is requisite variety (Ashby, 1956:207). How 
can the system cope with an over-complex environment? 
Another is contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967): How can we explain internal structures as a 
result of environmental demands? A third one is the 
input/output model (Easton, 1965): In what way are 
inputs processed into outputs through an internal 
conversion process? These are the guiding questions of 
the open system approach.
In a sense, the theory of self-referential systems seems 
to return to the concept of a closed system, even to a 
radical concept of closure. A system produces and 
reproduces its own elements through the interaction of 
its elements (Maturana et al , 1974:187) - by 
definition, a self-referential system is a closed 
system. However, what makes the theory more promising 
than both its forerunners is the inherent relation of 
self-referentiality to the environment. 
Self-referential systems, being closed systems of 
self-producing interactions, are, necessarily at the 
same time, open systems with boundary trespassing 
processes (Hejl, 1982b:57). And it is precisely the 
linkage between internalizing self-referential 
mechanisms and externalizing environment exchange 
mechanisms which makes the concept of self-reference 
more fruitful and more complex than its predecessors




























































































If we are using self-referentiality as the criterion to 
judge competing strategic models of post-instrumental 
law, two directions of analysis seem to be fruitful. 
One concerns the question what effective limits the 
self-referential structure of social systems sets to 
legal intervention. The second direction of analysis 
concerns the social knowledge which is necessary if law 
acting within those limits seeks to cope with 
self-referential structures of the regulated areas. 
Thus, we arrive at the following theses if we 
reformulate the premises of the competing strategic 
models in terms of that theory:
1. The Regulatory Trilemma: The implementation 
strategy will ultimately run aground on the internal 
dynamics of self-referential structures of both the 
regulating and the regulated system. Without taking 
into account the limits of "structural coupling", it 
inevitably ends in a trilemma: it leads to either 
"incongruence" of law and society, or 
"over-legalization" of society, or "over-socialization" 
of law. Moreover, the models of causal linearity which 
the implementation strategy is using seem to be 
insufficient as social knowledge to be required for the 
"regulation" of autopoietic systems.




























































































neglecting in its turn the need of self-referential 
systems to externalize, develops no obstacles against 
the dynamics of social self-closure. An increase in
subsystem rationality may be the result, but with
possibly disastrous effects in regard to the
coordination with the system's environment.
3. Response to Self-Referentiality; In contrast, the 
third strategic model seems to be compatible with 
self-referentiality. As we have seen, for the control 
of self-regulation, theorists have developed a broad 
range of rather diverse recommendations about the way to 
"proceduralize" the law. Now, in the light of 
self-referentiality, what seem to be obviously 
heterogeneous recommendations, can be interpreted as 
complementary strategies. The maintenance of a 
self-reproductive organization needs societal support. 
The recommendations can be read as strategies to make 
compatible the self-referentiality of various social 
sub-systems. "Proceduralization" represents society's 
response to the needs of self-referentiality: 
"autonomy", "externalization", and "coordination".
If we translate our problem of legal regulation into the 
language of self-reference a decisive difference becomes 
apparent. Models of regulation and of implementation, 
even if they are developed in the open system framework, 





























































































This means, that they see the relation between the 
regulating systems (politics and law) and the regulated 
system (functional subsystem, organization, interaction) 
as a relation between environment and system in which 
the regulating systems maintain and control the goals 
and the processes of the regulated systems. Deviant 
behavior is supposed to be controlled and corrected by 
the regulated system. This holds true even for recent 
reformulations of implementation theory (Mayntz, 
1979:55; 1983:7; Bohnert and Klitzsch, 1980:200). 
While it is true that they abandon a purely 
instrumentalist model and take into account autonomy in 
the regulated area and complicated interaction processes 
in the implementation field, they still have no adequate 
concept of what constitutes the autonomy of the 
regulated system. They still conceive of the regulated 
system as "allopoietic", as dependent on the actions of 
the regulating system.
In contrast, a theory of self-reference would define the 
regulated area as a system consisting of elements which 
interact with each other in such a way that they 
maintain themselves and reproduce elements having the 
same properties as a result of repeating the 
self-producing interaction (Hejl, 1982b:56). They are 
systems that keep their reproductive organization 
constant. To be sure, their concrete structures can be 




























































































the limits of that reproductive organization (see 
Maturana, 1982:20) Any external regulatory influence 
which leads to a new internal interaction of elements 
not maintaining its self-reproductive organization, is 
either irrelevant or leads to the désintégration of the 
regulated system (cf. Hejl, 1982b:58).
The picture becomes more complicated if we take into 
account that the regulating systems, politics and law, 
are themselves self-reproductive systems. We have then 
to reformulate the hierarchical relation of regulation 
into a circular interaction between three 
self-referential systems (law, politics, regulated 
subsystems). The limits of regulation are then defined 
by the threefold limits of self-reproduction. A 
regulatory action is successful only to the degree that
it maintains a self-producing internal interaction of
the elements in the regulating systems, law and politics
which is at the same time compatible with self-producing
internal interactions in the regulated system. This 
threefold compatibility relation may be called 
"structural coupling" (Maturana, 1982:20). Thus, we can 
formulate the regulatory trilemma: If regulation does 
not conform to the conditions of "structural coupling" 
of law, politics and society, it is bound to end up in 
regulatory failure. There are three ways regulation can 
f ail:




























































































The regulatory action is incompatible with the 
self-producing interactions of the regulated system. 
However, the regulated system reacts by not reacting. 
Since the regulatory action does not comply to the 
relevance criteria of the regulated system, it is simply 
irrelevant for the elements' interactions. The law is 
ineffective as it creates no change in behaviour. 
However, the self-producing organization remains intact, 
in law as well as in society. This is what one might 
call the "symbolic use" of politics and law (Edelmann, 
1964) .
(b ) "Over-Legalization" of Society
Again, the concrete self-producing interactions within 
law, politics and within society are not compatible with 
each other. In this case, however, the regulatory 
action influences the internal interaction of elements 
in the regulated field so strongly that their 
self-production is endangered. This leads to 
disintegrating effects in the regulated field, 
well-known under the heading of "colonialization" 
(Habermas, 1981:542). The regulatory programs obey a 
functional logic and follow criteria of rationality 
which are poorly suited to the internal social structure 
of the regulated spheres of life. Law as a medium of 
the welfare state works efficiently, but at the price of 





























































































(c) "Over-Socialization" of Law
A third type of regulatory failure should be taken into 
account. Once again incompatibility of self-production 
is the result of regulation, but in this case with the 
difference that the self-producing organization of the 
regulated area remains intact while the self-producing 
organization of the law is endangered. The law is 
"captured" by politics or by the regulated subsystem, 
the law is "politicized", "economized", "pedagogized" 
etc. with the result that the self-production of its 
normative elements gets overstrained. Overstrain of the 
law in the welfare state may be the effect of its 
political instrumentalization (Luhmann, 1984), but it 
may also be the law's "surrender" to other sub-systems 
of society at the cost of its own reproduction 
(Nonet/Selznick, 1978:76). The "over-socialization" of 
law may take on many forms.
All in all, these three types of regulatory failure 
which each show very distinctive features have one thing 
in common. In each case, regulatory law turns out to be 
ineffective because it overreaches the limitations which 
are built into the regulatory process: the 
self-referential organization of these systems, either 
the regulated field, or politics or the law itself. The 
effects are likewise problematic, being either 
irrelevance of regulation or aesintegrating effects in 





























































































Up to now we were concerned with the effective limits 
which the self-referential organization of regulated 
social areas sets to the implementation strategy. Now 
we focus on the question of social knowledge. The 
question is: Does the implementation strategy apply
adequate internal models of social reality in order to 
cope successfully with the self-referential organization 
of the regulated subsystems? As we have seen above, the 
implementation strategy works with purely
instrumentalist models which differ more or less only to 
the degree of their complication and refinement. In its 
most simple form a political goal or a political program 
is defined as purpose and the question is scrutinized if 
legal norms as means do reach this purpose. It becomes 
more complicated if one enriches the factual situation 
in the implementation field in order to assess the 
chances for realization more successfully. Another 
possibility is to ask for side-effects and dysfunctional 
consequences. Basically, however, the model is limited 
to linear causality: the goal determines the program,
the program determines the norm, the norm determines 
changes of behavior, those changes determine the desired 
effects.
It would be erroneous to insist that such model of 




























































































self-referential systems. The basal circularity of 
self-reference does not mean that any contact between 
systems is excluded. Rather, a limited mutual 
"understanding", is possible, however in a very 
complicated fashion. For "understanding" one social 
system has to internalize the self-referentiality of the 
other. This is a complicated process which makes 
plausible how limited causal models are for the 
intervention into self-referential systems. The simple 
model of "political goal - legal norm - social effects" 
would have to be enriched with social knowledge how 
self-referential systems receive regulatory information 
and how they process it according to their autonomous 
rules of internal interaction. This presupposes 
profound knowledge about general regularities of a 
self-closed structure and its effects in particular 
cases which is generally not at hand. Law would have to 
store social knowledge about the general 
self-referential circularity in different social 
sub-systems and their particular effects, a knowledge 
which even for social science is not available.
It is precisely this lack of social knowledge which was 
the reason why Renate Mayntz (1983), the leading 
researcher in implementation in West Germany, demanded a 
theoretical re-orientation of the whole implementation 
research. According to Mayntz, implementation research 




























































































middle range theories about political programs and their 
social effects in the implementation field. It runs 
aground on the complexities of the regulated area. What 
is possible is at best conceptualization, typologies and 
particular case studies. It is the non-generalizable 
case study which seems to be the only method available 
to collect knowledge about causal relations in the 
implementation fields. Cautious inductive conclusions 
from established experience to .future regulation 
determine potential ■ and limits of causal models in 
regulatory law.
What did we gain up to now from using the concept of 
self-referentiality? We utilized it as the criterion to 
judge the potential and limits of the implementation 
model. It led us to the regulatory trilemma as the 
basic limitation of the implementation strategy and 
within this limitation to the limited use of linear 
causal models. If it is true that instrumental law runs 
massively aground on the structures of 
self-referentiality, so that its absolute and relative 
limits are easily reached then the question emerges if 
and how at all law can cope with self-referential 
systems. Would this not mean that law has to retreat to 
its own basal circularity concentrating on internal 
interaction of its own elements -- norms, decisions, 
doctrines -- and leaving outside effects to whatever 




























































































rhetorical question. Perhaps it was the hidden wisdom 
of "autonomous law" which did not care for ethical, 
political, economic and social considerations. However, 
before one indulges to a resignative new justificiation 
of the old formalism, one Should scrutinize strategic 
models of post-instrumental law, which compete with the 
implementation model if they are better suited to 
respect the absolute limits of self-referentiality and 
to produce norms within these limits that are not a 
priori counter-productive. Again, we are using 
self-referentiality as the criterion in two directions: 
(1) limits of self-production, (2) social knowledge 
required for coping with self-reproductive organization.
IV. THREEE DIMENSIONS OF REFLEXIVE LAW: SOME
ILLUSTRATIONS
It seems there are needs of self-referential systems 
which all stem from the necessity of maintaining their 
basal circularity. Regulatory processes can interfere 
positively and negatively with those needs. They can 
sabotage them, they can neglect them, or they can 
support, even facilitate them. The external support of 
self-referentiality is precisely the place at which one 
should localize recent efforts to translate the 
intentions of regulatory law into "reflexive" models of 




























































































At first sight, they seem rather diverse and 
heterogeneous. But they are seen as to support each 
other if one re-interprets them in the light of 
self-referentiality. One way to interpret them is 
rather modest and only negative: they can be read so as 
to avoid the regulatory trilemma and to design legal 
interventions in such a way that the self-referential 
structure of law, politics and society are not 
infringed. Another interpretation is more ambitious and 
more positive: they attempt to define certain basic 
needs of self-referential systems and to design a law 
which is responsive to those needs.
To be sure, self-referentiality is a highly abstract 
concept. If it is supposed to serve as a criterion to 
judge the social adequacy of legal interventions, 
everything depends on its respecification in concrete 
contexts (Joerges, 1983:14). Thus, one of the most 
important tasks for this theory will be to identify the
concrete mechanisms of self-referential closure and
openness and the linkage between them (see as an
important step into this direction, Luhmann, 1984:8).
1. Autonomy: School Law
Juergen Habermas (1981:522), in his discussion of recent 




























































































sensitivity in this direction. His ambivalent attitude 
toward legal welfare-state interventions in the 
"life-world" can be interpreted reflecting the 
dilemmatic structure of law in its double capacity to 
infringe and to facilitate self-productive interactions 
in the spheres of socialization, social integration and 
cultural reproduction. Habermas considers legal 
regulation as "destructive to the very nature of such 
relations" (Blankenburg, 1984:7). This is only one 
aspect. However Blankenburg misses the crucial point 
when he interprets Habermas as postulating "to keep any 
sort of legal regulation out of interactions that need 
spontaneous social communication". This is for 
misrepresenting Habermas as a partisan of a naive 
communal de-legalization movement. Habermas has a 
strongly normative interest in the law as such, 
especially in its emancipatory potential as a 
universalization mechanism (Habermas, 1962:91, 242; 
1963:82; 1973:123; 1976:260; 1981:322, 364, 522). In 
the case of welfare state law he searches for criteria 
which would allow one to distinguish at least 
analytically between the law's capacity to guarantee 
freedom and its capacities to destroy it ' (Habermas, 
1981:534 ff.) He comes up with the distinction between 
law as medium and law as institution, the test being the 
justifiability through moral norms of the "life-world". 
As a medium, law is a functional socio-technological 




























































































economy and politics are "colonizing" central areas of 
cultural reproduction, social integration and 
socialization. Only when law is restricted to an 
"external constitution" of the "life-world" spheres, can 
it serve as an "institution" facilitating rather than 
desintegrating "consensus oriented procedures of 
conflict regulation" (Habermas, 1981:546, 544).
In our interpretation, this concept of law as 
"institution" shows signs of adequacy to 
self-referential structures within certain social 
contexts. Take the example of school law which Habermas 
uses. By protecting children's and parents' basic 
rights against the school administration, the law tends 
to free the education process from bureaucratic and 
administrative constraints. However, as a medium it is, 
in itself, in conflict with the form of pedagogic action 
if it is not restricted to the mere "frame of a legal 
school constitution". In the past the function of the 
"school constitution" was to secure its freedom from 
administrative pressure. And its future function could 
be - if we may extrapolate from Habermas' argument - to 
defend it against those bureaucratic processes which 
translate the "economic system imperative to de-couple 
the school system from the basic right of education 
(Bildung) and to close-circuit it with the occupation 
system" (Habermas, 1981:545). It is only within such a 




























































































constitution" that the educational system has a chance 
of defining on its own in what respect it will depend 
upon its environment in self-referential processes. An 
external constitution thus facilitates internal
reflection on the basic orientation of education: 
balancing environmental demands of performance 
knowledge, skills -- against its proper social function 
-- "Bildung", learning how to. learn (see Luhmann and 
Schorr, 1979:18).
Of course, this is a precarious process. It is a
paradoxical technique: fire to fight fire. And there
are no guarantees against burning down the whole area, 
against an almost total legalization and judicialization 
(Blankenburg, 1984:24). But at the same time there is 
no reason to believe that a blind automatism is at work. 
Rather, it is a matter of political commitment and 
careful institutional design. Habermas himself shows 
this sensitivity to the problem by sympathizing with the 
paradoxical suggestion of Simitis and Zenz (1975:51): 
to dejudicialize legalized conflicts.
Such a retreat of the law from a regulation of whole 
life areas to the mere guarantee of their autonomy has 
effects not only for the areas concerned but for the law 
itself. If the law is relieved from its regulatory 
function, it is relieved at the same time in its 




























































































concentrating on securing social autonomy needs not to 
utilize ambitious models of causal relation between 
legal norm and social effects. It suffices to develop a 
very general and rather vague understanding of 
self-regulatory processes in the social areas concerned. 
Since its function is the enablement of freedom within 
delimitated autonomous areas no knowledge is needed 
about their internal processes.
As useful as the concept of the external constitution 
is, there are two points which show the necessi.ty of 
reformulating the argument. One is its generalization 
and re-specification; the other shows that an external 
constitution in this sense is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for "reflexive law".
The effect of legalization processes desintegrating 
reproductive structures is not limited to the spheres of 
the "life-world". Any social system with a 
self-referential structure can be endangered by outside 
interference in the self-productive interaction of its 
elements (Hejl, 1982b:58). Even the "systems" of 
economy and politics can be paralyzed by legalization. 
This is again a problem of self-referentiality. 
Economic and political processes will be paralyzed if 
their self-productive and reproductive capacities are 
infringed. Thus, the concept of "colonialization" needs 





























































































This is the point at which the crucial task of 
re-specification begins for a theory of
self-referentiality to define for any social system the 
specific self-productive mechanisms that need to be 
shielded from outside interference, whether it be a 
great functional system (politics, economy, education, 
religion, family, etc.)/ or be it a large organization 
or a small interaction. Of course, in this operation 
one abstracts from the difference between system and 
life-world which is crucial for Habermas' normative 
intentions. However, those intentions need not be given 
up; they can be re-introduced at a more general level 
through the concept of responsiveness to human needs, 
which would cut through the system/life-world difference 
and be applicable to any social system.
2. Externalization: Corporate Social Responsibility
This re-specification is necessary if "reflexive" legal 
action is to go beyond the mere securing of autonomy 
(see Teubner and Willke, 1984). Autonomy is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient precondition of
self-referential processes. It does not guarantee their 
success. Self-referentiality is a precarious structure. 




























































































self-referential systems need outside support to develop 
certain externalizations. The political system, for 
example, tends to operate too selectively and tends to 
concentrate on the complicated games of politics, 
thereby neglecting problems of its social environment 
(Luhmann, 1981:57). In a similar way, the economic 
system works selectively via the language of monetary 
action and is not able to adequately re-translate its 
environmental consequences into its own language 
(Willke, 1982).
Insofar as systems cannot develop sufficient 
externalization on their own, outside pressures are 
needed to impose structures on them which avoid 
self-closure. This is not to say that law or politics 
are the only, or even the main, outside mechanisms of 
enforcing externalization. Law can serve only as one 
among other compensatory institutions of society which 
compensate for the self-reference of social systems. 
Compensatory institutions have to operate under the 
double constraint of integrating environmental demands 
into the system while not aesintegrating its conditions 
of self-production and reproduction.
"Corporate social responsibility" is a good case in 
point (see Teubner, 1983:34; 1984). If it is meant to 




























































































seriously as a compensatory institution which builds 
social side-purposes into economic action (Willke, 
1982:17), then a powerful outside pressure which is 
supported by political-legal measures is necessary. 
However, it has been demonstrated again and again how 
easily "external" regulations run aground on the 
regulatory trilemma (Stone, 1975:93; 1984). The most 
promising approach seems to be "internal" regulation: 
strategic intervention into certain characteristics of 
the organization's decision-making process; the 
so-called structural, as opposed to the duty-approach 
(Teubner, 1983:48; 1984; Wedderburn, 1984). Their 
success, however, depends upon their taking into account 
the self-referential structure of economic 
organizations. For example, they have to follow what 
Krause calls a "profit-threatening strategy" (Krause, 
1984 ) .
As the example shows, this poses problems of power. 
Political and social power is needed to exert external 
pressure on established social systems to externalize 
their self-reference. The imposition of an "external 
constitution"; the re-distribution of property rights 
to hitherto excluded constituencies; the redesign of 
decisional procedures; all constituting the core 
elements of "reflexive law", aim at a power change 
within the subsystem in question and demand strong power 




























































































Historical examples -- the legal institutionalization of 
collective bargaining and of co-determination of labour 
-- show that the role of law in influencing power 
relations is not simply marginal. Rather, law is one of 
the major mechanisms to change social power relations 
inside the organization (IDE, 1979). Formalizing 
property rights which are backed by the sanctioning 
power of the state clearly does not create social power, 
but it stabilizes social power rendering it, to a 
certain degree, independent from fluctuations of 
shifting power and market relations.
Thus, reflexive law depends on political power relations 
and in this respect, does not differ from regulatory 
law. In situations of social power relations, the 
success of both legal forms depends on the extensive use 
of political power resources. There is, however, a 
decisive difference. The difference concerns the 
strategic use of power as a limited resource. 
Regulatory law, working with detailed regulation and a 
sophisticated implementation machinery, is bound to 
liquidate a large amount of socio-political power-. 
Techniques of reflexive law, however, tend to minimize 
that liquidation by restricting themselves to certain 
strategic organizational and procedural key-variables. 
Galanter (1974) makes this point very clearly. 
Concerned with the problem of how to use the law to 




























































































considers a whole range of strategic variables (legal 
rules, institutions, lawyers, parties). Under the 
perspective of effectiveness, he clearly prefers 
organizational variables over material legal rules. It 
makes for a more economic use of the scarce power 
resources to concentrate them on the strategic changes 
of the organization rather than dispersing them in 
permanent regulatory efforts.
It should be stated clearly, however, that power 
equalization is not the primary aspect of "reflexive 
law". As important as it is in the public control of 
private government (Macaulay, 1983) it does not make 
sense to tie the concept of "reflexive law" too closely 
to power-equalization within social subsystems, 
especially private organizations. The minimization of 
power is not a reasonable normative end in itself, it is 
an instrumental device for achieving certain social 
goals. Strategies of power-equalization make sense only 
if those goals are expected to be achieved through 
symmetrical power relations. This is not immediately 
apparent. Power-equalizing strategies are well suited 
to situations of zero-sum-games: gains in power on the 
one side mean losses of power on the other. The optimal 
state is a precarious power-equilibrium. The law's role 
in private organizations would be to control misuse of 
power and to stabilize the equilibrium. This is the 




























































































a change from equilibrium models to growth models of 
organizations would drastically change the law's 
relation to power: "The division of power is not the 
thing to be considered but that method of organization 
which will generate power" (Lammers, 1967). In a growth 
model, power is seen not as a constant but as a variable 
phenomenon. In consequence, power-equalization only 
amounts to a "distributive-regressive" solution of the 
organization problem while the "productive-progressive" 
solution would be an increase of collective need 
satisfaction through mutual power-increase and power 
distribution (Hondrich, 1975:55).
Within this perspective, power is not primarily seen as 
a source of inequality and injustice but as a social 
instrument for an effective transfer of decisions. The 
task of the law then is still to control power abuses, 
but the central problem becomes rather to design 
institutional mechanisms that mutually increase the 
power of members and leadership in private 
organizations. Lammers (1967:201), for example, 
concludes in "Power and Participation": "Managers and 
managed in organizations can, at the same time, come to 
influence each other more effectively and thereby 
generate joint power as the outcome of a better command 





























































































That means, among other things, that power-equalization 
is not suited to use as a criterion for distinguishing 
between conservative and progressive forms of "reflexive 
law", centrist and radical views of decentralization 
(Unger, 1983). More even, being bound to static 
equilibrium models, power-equalization appears itself as 
a conservative strategy. If we are looking for 
normative criteria to judge social institutions, 
responsiveness to human needs (Hondrich, 1975) is the 
case in point and not neutralization of power. Dynamic, 
flexible institutions with strong asymmetric power 
relations can, under certain conditions, be more 
responsive to human needs than self-closed, 
power-symmetrical, equilibrium institutions.
More important than the issue of power is the question 
what kind of social knowledge is necessary for the law 
in order to intervene in self-referential systems 
successfully. What is the use of increasing power 
resources if the cognitive resources are lacking, or if 
they are so insufficient that they guide power resources 
into the wrong direction? Indeed, reflexive law clearly 
needs more and different social knowledge than a law 
which restricts itself to an "external constitution". 
This might suggest that reflexive modes of social 
guidance overload the cognitive competences of the law. 
However, it should be seen as well that the reality 




























































































requirements than those needed in comprehensive planning 
models of regulatory law. As in the case of power 
resources, reflexive forms of law aim at an "economic" 
use of cognitive resources. A profound "understanding" 
of the total self-referential structures and processes 
in the implementation field is not necessary. As Hayek 
(1972, 1973) has demonstrated convincingly in his 
critique of constructivist interventionism, even science 
is not in a position to achieve such a profound 
understanding of particular processes in complex 
structures, much less then politics or law. The 
"economic" advantage of reflexive law is that it 
requires only general knowledge of the 
self-referentiality and needs not to control specific 
effects. It is sufficient to restrict "understanding" 
to the strategic structures according to which reflexion 
processes take place within the social subsystem 
concerned, since reflexive law intends only to change 
those general forms of procedure and organization. If 
it is true, for example, that in the economic system, 
reflexion takes place at the general level of monetary 
policies, then it would be sufficient to use social 
knowledge about the banking sector and its political 
processes in their general structure in order to achieve 
changes. One would not need models for the total 
economic system and its particular processes. Another 
example: If the reflexion center of an economic 



























































































corporation law could utilize rather simple models about 
the internal decision making in order to influence 
reflexion processes through norms of organization and 
procedure.
3. Coordination: Concerted Action
Up to this point, we have discussed how law reflects two 
basic needs of self-referential subsystems: the need 
for autonomy and the need for externalization. A third 
dimension becomes apparent if one takes into account 
that not only social subsystems but also the 
encompassing society as a whole constitutes a 
self-referential system. The interaction of the 
functional subsystems, politics, economy, law, 
education, religion, family etc. can be seen as a 
self-producing interaction between elements of a larger 
system. Each of these subsystems contributes to the 
maintenance of societal self-reference. The law's 
contribution in this respect is the resolution of 
inter-system-conflicts. Helmut Willke (1983) has 
developed a concept of a legal program aiming at this 
function: the "relational program". As opposed to the 
typical programs of formal law (conditional program) and 
of instrumental law (purpose program), the function of 
relational programs is to make compatible different 
purposes and rationalities of social sub-systems by 




























































































procedures of decision-making. He identifies the
emergence of this new type of legal program in diverse 
inter-system-coordination mechanisms, such as the
Concerted Action (Konzertierte Aktion) or the Science 
Council (Wissenschaftsrat) in the Federal Republic.
One promising mode to understand the working of such 
"relational programs" can be found in the theory of 
"black-boxes" developed in the context of cybernetics 
(Glanville, 1975). Self-referential system - social
systems like law, politics and regulated subsystems 
are "black boxes" in the sense of being mutually 
inaccessible to each other. One knows the input and the 
output, the conversion however remains obscure. Now, 
black-box-techniques do not aim at shedding light into 
this obscure internal conversion process, but circumvent 
the problem by an indirect "procedural" activity. They 
concentrate not on the internal relations within the 
black box, but on the interrelation between the black 
boxes. Black boxes become "whitened" in the sense that 
an interaction relation develops among them which is 
transparent for them in its regularities. So law still 
can not intervene directly into the economy, legal 
access however consists in the relation between law and 
economy. This means to be the peculiarity of relational 
programs which regulate internal processes in systems 
indirectly so that they concentrate on the relations 




























































































decrease the requirements of cognitive capacities of law 
and politics. Since they do not any longer attempt to 
directly influence economic action but to influence only 
the "concerted action" the internal structure of which 
is for them much more transparent.
It is crucial that between the interaction relation and 
the regulated system, in our example, between concerted 
action and economy, consists a dense connection which is 
the source for guidance effects. This is to be expected 
from two mechanisms. One is the commitment of economic 
actors in the concerted action and the other is that the 
concerted action as such develops cognitive modes of the 
economy which may be more adequate than those of 
politics and of the law. The whole way of thinking is 
quite close to what Lindblom called the combination of 
social knowledge and interaction (Lindblom and Cohen, 
1979). According to Lindblom one has to give up 
concepts of comprehensive social planning since they are 
utopian and unrealistic and has to replace them by more 
realistic models in which limited and strategic 
knowledge is combined with social interaction, that is 
in our concept the interaction among the two black-boxes 
in order to reach guidance effects within one of the 
black-boxes.
Autonomy, externalization and coordination - these are 




























































































basic needs of self-referential systems. These
♦dimensions have been analyzed by different legal 
theorists with the intention of pointing out the 
developmental tendencies of post-instrumental law. With 
the concept of self-referentiality I have tried to 
demonstrate that they represent complementary rather 
than competing approaches. "Proceduralization" of the 
law (Wiethoelter, 1982, 1984), as opposed to
formalization and to materialization is one formula 
which captures what they have in common. Another, with 
slightly different nuances is the "constitution of 
organization" (Brueggemeier, 1982) as opposed to the 
constitution of status and of contract. A third one 
would be "relational program" or "reflexive law",
stressing the aspect of legal prerequisites for social 
self-regulation (Teubner, 1982; Willke, 1983, 1984).
Clearly, those formula invite misunderstanding 
(Blankenburg, 1984). If they are arbitrarily separated 
from their theoretical background (functionalist or 
"critical" macro-theories) and are equated with just any 
type of procedural and organizational law, for example, 
in a stratified society, they become rather meaningless. 
It is then easy to ask: What's new?
More serious questions have to be raised about the 
relation of procedural elements to formal and material 
elements in the post-instrumental law. Again, in any 




























































































though with different weight and different functions. 
After all, classical "formal" law had specific content 
and specific procedures (Teubner, 1982: 252 ;. 
Wiethoelter, 1984). What are the material orientations 
of post-instrumental law?
The answer can be only very tentative. Material 
orientations of procedural law aim at nothing less 
amibitious than a bridging of functionalist and critical 
approaches to social theory. Wiethoelter argues 
explicitly for an understanding of "proceduralization" 
as "the problem of the justification of 'reasonable' 
practical actions under 'system' - conditions". The 
goal is to create a "forum, in which transformations of 
society are dealt with reconstructively and 
prospectively" (Wiethoelter, 1984). I think I agree 
with the general intention. I would, however, prefer to 
point to the limited potential of practical philosophy 
beyond the sphere of morality in personal interaction 
and to stress the aspect of enhancing specific learning 
capacities in decentralized social subsystems. These 
learning capacities should be oriented toward 
re-introducing the consequences of ac* of social 
sub-systems into their own reflexion structure. Setting 
such a context of discovery —  would that satisfy our 
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